Documents confirm US colluded in Indonesia’s 1969 incorporation of Papua
By
John Roberts
30 August 2004
Recently declassified documents from the archives of the US State
Department have shed a little more light on one of the many grubby
chapters of US foreign policy in the Cold War period: how Washington
worked with the UN and Indonesia’s Suharto dictatorship to stage a
phoney “Act of Free Choice” in West Papua in 1969.
West Papua,
or West Irian, remained under Dutch control following Indonesian
independence in 1949, as part of the settlement presided over by
Washington. Talks on its future status between the Netherlands and
Indonesia were meant to follow, but never took place.
The WSWS needs your support!
Your donations go directly to financing, improving, and expanding the web site.
Donate
The
Dutch, seeking to cling onto West Papua as a base of operations in the
region, cultivated a small educated Papuan elite and promoted the idea
of an “independent” Papua. For President Sukarno, however, the
incorporation of West Papua into Indonesia became a nationalist rallying
cry to bolster his shaky regime. In response to a declaration of
“Papuan independence” in 1961, Indonesian troops took over the
territory.
US President Kennedy, keen to strengthen relations
with Sukarno, sided with Indonesia and compelled the Netherlands to sign
an agreement in New York in August 1962. Following a short period under
UN administration, West Papua was handed over to Indonesian control in
1963 subject only to a UN-supervised “Act of Free Choice” (AFC)
scheduled for 1969.
Following the 1965-66 US-backed coup led
by General Suharto in Indonesia, US administrations, first of Lyndon
Johnson and then Richard Nixon, were adamant that West Papua had to
remain part of Indonesia. Washington’s main concern was to ensure the
stability of the Suharto junta as the lynchpin of US strategic policy in
a region increasingly destabilised by the Vietnam War.
The documents collated by the US-based private research organisation National Security Archives [
www.narchive.org]
and released last month primarily cover the period 1967-69—that is the
lead up to the AFC. They reveal the cynicism with which US and UN
officials approached the task of “consulting” Papuans in July 1969 and
then getting the outcome rubberstamped by the UN General Assembly in
November 1969.
Cables to the US State Department from the
Embassy in Jakarta made clear that the wishes of the Papuan population
were of no concern to the US. The top priority was to ensure the
survival of Suharto as a bulwark in the region. There were economic
interests as well. In 1967, Suharto opened up Indonesia to US
investment. One of the first beneficiaries was the New Orleans-based
Freeport corporation, which develop a huge gold and copper mine at
Grasberg in Papua.
In August 1968, US Ambassador in Jakarta,
Marshall Green, telegraphed Washington, explaining: “Retention of West
Irian as full fledged Indonesian province is a political necessity for
Suharto government and for [Indonesian foreign minister] Adam Malik....
[L]oss of territory through ‘Act of Free Choice’ would undermine Malik
and deal serious blow to Indonesia’s political stability.... [P]olitical
Muslims and jingoists ... would use loss of West Irian as basis for all
out attack on Suharto administration and moderates who are now setting
Indonesian policy. They could set in motion trends which would unseat
this government....”
Green warned, however, that the US should
work behind the scenes and “not become directly involved in the issue”
but at the same time make the US stance clear. “[I]t would be
unrealistic for any UN member who knows the situation in West Irian to
hold out for free and direct elections, nor should we refer to UN
‘supervision’ when this is not stipulated in Agreement,” he declared.
It
had already become clear from a US consular visit to Papua in early
1968 that Indonesia’s presence was “expressed primarily in the form of
the army”. The US consul noted the “antipathy or outright hatred
believed to be harboured towards Indonesia” in more developed areas. “It
is the opinion of most observers in the area that Indonesia will not
accept independence for West Irian and will not permit a plebiscite
which would reach such an outcome,” he added.
The reason for
the hostility was evident. Following the takeover in 1963, Indonesian
authorities cracked down on any opposition to their presence. In the
aftermath of Suharto’s coup, the military imposed the same repressive
measures as it used throughout the archipelago, which resulted in the
genocide of at least half a million supporters of the Indonesian
Communist Party (PKI) and other political opponents.
Stepped-up repression
In
the lead-up to the AFC, the crackdown intensified. A June 1969 survey
by a US Embassy official in Jakarta reported stepped-up police and
military efforts to prevent any public expression of opposition,
including “preventive arrests since late April of known Free Papua
activists, round-up in Djajapura of one man-one vote demonstration
leaders”. It gave details of the isolation by the military of revolts in
more remote areas, including in North Biak, Bird’s Head and Medunamani.
The
report noted, however, that the Papuan opposition lacked cohesion,
making a broad revolt unlikely and, in any case, the Indonesians were
ready to “contain and, if necessary, suppress it”. The official assured
Washington that the Indonesian government was sensitive to its
international “image” and would “avoid actions that will reflect
negatively on the credibility of the AFC in the sensitive eyes of the
Netherlands, Australia and with [UN Secretary General] U Thant.”
The
survey concluded by stating its agreement with State Department
policies, adding: “US government has nothing to gain by interfering in
an already complex problem and thereby disrupting present fruitful
relationship with the government of Indonesia.”
Frank
Galbraith, who took over from Green as US ambassador, was well aware
that the upcoming AFC would be a farce. In a memo to Washington in early
July 1969, he estimated that “85 to 90 percent” of the population was
“in sympathy with the Free Papua cause”. He observed that Indonesian
military operations, which had already killed thousands of civilians,
“had stimulated fears and rumours of intended genocide among the
Irianese”.
President Nixon, who had taken office in early
1969, visited Indonesia immediately before the AFC. In a briefing prior
to the trip, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger focussed
attention on the US priority—assuring Suharto’s support in the region as
the US sought to extricate itself from Vietnam. Describing Suharto as
“a moderate military man” who achieved “impressive results” in “cleaning
up the mess left by Sukarno”, Kissinger urged Nixon to impress on the
dictator “a sense of our shared purposes and goals in Southeast Asia”.
On
Papua, Kissinger strongly advised against any discussion. He described
the AFC as “a series of consultations, rather than a direct election,
which would be almost meaningless among the stone age cultures of New
Guinea”. He noted the presence of a UN observer on the scene but “we
assume that U Thant will go along with the Indonesian form of the Act of
Free Choice”. Because of the anti-Indonesian opposition, Kissinger
advised Nixon to “avoid any US identification with that act”.
Initially
there were concerns in Jakarta that the UN observer Oritz Sanz might
upset proceedings. Green had telegraphed Washington in August 1968
asking if anyone in the American UN mission had a “close personal
relationship” with Sanz. He insisted that “given the high stakes riding
on Oritz Sanz’s mission and importance of his getting off on right foot,
I believe we should do anything we can indirectly to make him aware of
political realities”.
Green had little to worry about. A US
official at the UN began acquainting Sanz with the “political realities”
before he left New York. Sanz “looks forward to making discreet
personal contact with Ambassador Green,” he reported. Sanz worked with
US officials in urging Suharto to dress up the AFC. Suharto was under
pressure from elements of his regime to simply call off the process.
A
US Embassy memorandum recorded a conversation in April 1969 in Sanz’s
office involving Indonesian officials. Sanz pointed out that the 1962
New York agreement provided for the right of freedom of speech and
assembly in West Irian. In reply, an Indonesian official referred to
Malik’s attitude, which was that if such rights were granted in West
Irian they would have to be granted in the rest of Indonesia. If such
concessions were made, Malik was reported to have said, “the Government
of Indonesia would be facing rebellion from various parts of the country
within 15 days”.
Nothing resembling democratic rights was
permitted in West Papua. The AFC consisted of “consultations” over six
weeks in July/August 1969 with just over a thousand handpicked tribal
leaders. No popular vote took place. Indonesian authorities ran the
proceedings, with a strong military presence. Through a mixture of
bribes and threats, the tribal chiefs unanimously “agreed” to the
incorporation of Papua into Indonesia.
The final hurdle for
Jakarta and Washington was to get the UN to endorse this farce. It was
delayed as late as possible and timed to ensure other issues were
dominating the UN General Assembly. Sanz was critical of aspects of the
AFC, but, as the US documents confirm, this was mainly for show.
On
November 17, 1969, just two days prior to the UN vote, US Secretary of
State William Rogers, Green, Malik and other US and Indonesian officials
held a meeting in which they stressed their common desire for a quick
UN decision without any debate. Malik raised concerns that several
French-speaking African nations were preparing to object. Rogers
reassured Malik that he had been in touch with these delegations and
emphasised to them that they had no grounds for objecting. He cautioned
against the US being “too active”. “What we want to do,” he said, “is to
be discreet but at the same time persuasive.”
The persuasion,
it appears, worked. Sanz’s report was read by U Thant without any
further comment. The General Assembly “took note” of the Act of Free
Choice, with 30 abstentions, thereby giving its imprimatur to the sham.
US
support for Indonesia over Papua helped to cement a close relationship
with the Suharto dictatorship, which lasted for more than three decades.
Successive US presidents turned a blind eye to the savage repression
meted out by this “moderate military man” against any form of political
opposition, not only in Papua, but throughout the country.
Kissinger
personally benefited from the Indonesian takeover. As a director of the
US Freeport-McMoRan, which continues to run the huge Papuan mine, he
reportedly received an annual fee of more than $500,000 over the period
1995-2001. In addition, he has been a major stockholder in the company
and his consulting firm has received large fees.
source :http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2004/08/papua-a30.html
